You will take on the role of human resources (HR) director of the firm to discuss the situation, propose ethical guidelines for the organization, and analyze possible solutions to address the ethical dilemma for the company.
TechFite, a British company that produces high-technology goods, recently began production of its innovative recreational equipment in its first U.S. factory in Dellberg. TechFite is widely known for its culture of workplace collaboration and leadership development. Additionally, the company culture encourages employee empowerment and engagement in corporate decision making. The company also prides itself on being actively involved in the communities in which they have a presence.
As the human resources (HR) director of the new factory in Dellberg, you soon realize there are financial obstacles that must be addressed as it relates to hourly employees. The budgeting process has constrained the amount of funding available to provide full-time employee benefits, and hours have been reduced to keep many employees classified as part-time. The HR department needs to develop policies to address the legal and cultural differences between the United States and the United Kingdom pertaining to hours and benefits. As the HR director, you are grappling with the ethical obligations to your employees and the limited funds available. Upon a review of the budget, excessive bonuses are being paid out to top executives.
During one of the company’s presentations to the Dellberg city council, commitments were made to sponsor community events, to support local youth leadership development programs, and to invest in infrastructure to aid in the rebuilding of the city of Dellberg utilizing environmentally responsible techniques. Up to this point, these commitments have not been addressed or funded by TechFite. The leadership team realizes the importance of community involvement, and this commitment is central to their corporate culture. A plan needs to be developed to meet the company’s corporate social responsibility to the city.
While residents of the city were excited about the company’s investment and the opportunity for new jobs in a bankrupt city, relationships quickly began to deteriorate when employees began to complain about wages, benefits, and weekly hours that fell far below the 40 hours necessary to receive full-time benefits under company policies. In addition, the company is not fulfilling the commitments it made to city officials about community involvement.
As part of its launch into the United States, TechFite realizes that corporate actions must be consistent with company culture to gain acceptance. Two primary focuses will be making this a great place to work and developing a strong presence as a company that is good for the community.
A. Create three corporate policies that reflect the organization’s culture and ethical viewpoints. 1. Explain the rationale behind the policies, including how they align with the organization’s culture. 2. Distingush between ethical and legal issues. 3. Analyze the ethical issues at stake in the scenario (e.g., conflict of interest, misuse of resources, whistleblowing). 4. Describe the purpose of the ethics officer.
B. Describe corporate social responsibility and how it applies to the scenario. 1. Explain the ethical desirability of improving the company’s reputation in the community based on the scenario. The explanation should include three supporting examples of what the company has done or failed to do that has harmed its image in the community. 2. Describe an ethically, socially, and environmentally responsible course of action to address each example from part B1 based on the company’s culture and core values. 3. Explain how the course of action from part 62 is ethically, socially, and environmentally responsible.
Cerebrum in a Vat Theory by Hilary Putnam | Analysis Disclaimer: This work has been put together by an understudy. This isn't a case of the work composed by our expert scholarly essayists. You can see tests of our expert work here. Any sentiments, discoveries, ends or proposals communicated in this material are those of the writers and don't really mirror the perspectives of UK Essays. Distributed: Fri, 05 Jan 2018 In Hilary Putnam's Brain-in-a-vat (BIV) case, a world exists in which brains, a neuroscientist, a supercomputer running recreations of brains contained in a vat, and the vat itself are the main items. These things have either dependably existed or showed up totally haphazardly with every thing in a similar state (i.e. PCs running reproductions, brains are in vats, and so on.) Understanding this, envision the accompanying situation: You are the malicious researcher who screens BIV's and the encounters they get from the PCs. You guarantee that all the BIV's associated trust they are carrying on with a useful life in Springfield, Illinois. One of your BIV's is code-named "The Chancellor." After some time passes, the Chancellor practically articulates the expression "I know I am only a cerebrum in-a-vat," which he accepts to be valid, and after that proceeds with his customized capacities. The BIV situation Putnam presents is one such contention setting the incredulous theory. Much like the Descartes' Evil Genius, the distrustful theory calls into question one's information of the outside world. While the Evil Genius depends on an incomparable misdirecting god, Putnam's BIV contemplates the impacts of a distraught researcher utilizing PCs to prompt fanciful observations and encounters. Conventional cynics battle we can't recognize the BIV theory as false; if we somehow happened to concede the BIV premises as obvious, at that point our encounters would seem just they directly do (Stanford 2009). Subsequently, doubters keep up that we do not have the capacity to know anything about the world outer to us. Putnam applies his semantic externalism and therefore considers the situation with the Chancellor unthinkable. Semantic externalism is a type of externalism where "implications and truth states of one's sentences, and the substance of one's purposeful mental states, rely on the character of one's outside, causal condition" (Stanford 2009). All the more accurately, he centers his worry to the primary individual sentence, "I am a cerebrum in-a-vat" to exhibit that an example in which the Chancellor verbally expressed said state is essentially false. Thusly, Putnam reasons that we mustn't be BIVs. I will contend that Putnam abuses the meaning of "vat" in his mind in-a-vat test, in this way diminishing his probability of discrediting the doubtful speculation. In this paper, I will characterize semantic externalism, trailed by Putnam's utilization of it against three diverse BIV situations. If we somehow managed to acknowledge semantic externalism, at that point we would essentially recognize that how we characterize a term isn't the sole factor in choosing what the word intends to us. A typical case would be the examination of a commonplace substance (e.g. water) and how its significance would stay steady even before experiencing it. All the more unequivocally, the individuals who stick to semantic externalism would see "water" as a term attributed to a substance with a compound structure of H2O before researchers had perceived the particles containing it; notwithstanding, the piece of this substance we had named "water" did, to some degree, add to our importance (DeRose 102). For Putnam, cooperation with things on the planet speaks to the outer factor. For instance, consider two individuals who have the same mental states and afterward begin collaborating with substances which are cosmetically comparative while still made out of various atoms. Maybe one individual communicates only with Ag (silver), and alternate interfaces just with ABC, yet both take in "silver" to allude to every one of their particular substances. Therefore, every individual would have the same mental states (wants, convictions, volitions, and so forth.), however with varying in what they reference; "silver" would mean Ag for one, and ABC for the other. With the goal for Putnam to associate semantic externalism to his BIV analyze, he starts by taking note of that it is important to recognize that any verbalization of the sentence "I am a mind in-a-vat" has all the earmarks of being self-disproving. All the more definitely, if we somehow managed to keep up this sentence to be valid, the sentence would at present infer a false end since we couldn't state "I am a mind in-a-vat" and realize that I am in such a state. Take for instance the announcement "[t]here is no unequivocal explanation." If you see this announcement as obvious, it would need to be false in light of the fact that it is a clear articulation. In the event that you placed the announcement to be false, at that point the appropriate response is still false. To show how this identifies with Putnam's BIV's, first accept that we really exist in the substantial world (T) similarly as generally held, rather than in vats (occasion T, where T is the Tangible world.) We have the accompanying: (T1) If I live in a Tangible world, I am not a "Mind in-a-vat." (T2) In occasion T, I live in an unmistakable world. (TC) I am not a "Mind in-a-vat" (True)(T1, T2) I am not a BIV. (TC) Next, consider we are currently the brains in the vats an alternate occasion (example BIV). In this occasion BIV, a mind boggling figuring framework constantly bolsters us marvelous encounters. In this way, we currently have the convoluted processing framework sending us signals for us to develop our encounters. Presently we have an alternate issue in case BIV: (BIV1)If I am a real BIV, a PC is sending me exceptional encounters. (BIV2) I am a real BIV. (BIV3)A PC is sending me remarkable encounters. (BIV1, BIV2) (BIV4)If I articulate "I am a BIV", I am a mind in-a-vat. (False, BIV3) (BIVC) "I am not a mind in-a-vat" (True) (BIV1, BIV2, BIV3, BIV4) Accordingly, "I am not a mind in-a-vat" (BIVC) To clear up, semantic externalism suggests that the subject will never associate with the Tangible vats on the planet. Thus, when the Chancellor emphasizes "vat," he doesn't mean unmistakable vats, yet rather the source of these electric driving forces. All the more exactly, when he says "vat" he implies counterfeit vats since he really interfaced with a PC program. On the off chance that the Chancellor was alluding to a mind in the example BIV, that cerebrum would allude the electrical driving forces sent from the PC as fake vats. Consequently, we touch base at the accompanying situation: (BIV1) "I am a cerebrum in-a-vat" (False); (BIV1) suggests (BIV2) "I am not a mind in-a-vat" (True) (BIV1, BIV2) suggests we are not brains in vats. Therefore, the idea that "I am a cerebrum in-a-vat" has all the earmarks of being a self-discrediting as indicated by Putnam. After Putnam trusts he has set up this self-nullification, he should shape a non specific (i.e. generally pertinent) contention (U). Consequently, the accompanying occurrence: Emphasis of (U1) "I am a cerebrum in-a-vat" (false, essentially); (U2) "I am not a mind in-a-vat" (from U1)(true, essentially) (UC)If I am not a mind in-a-vat, at that point we are not brains in vats. We are not brains in vats. (UC) The articulating of "I am a cerebrum in-a-vat" must be false since the example BIV infers that we are not brains in vats. Therefore, we mustn't be brains in vats as indicated by this rationale. While at first glance this may appear to be sound, I mean to demonstrate how Putnam may have come up short. At first look, the rationale behind the Tangible world case, the BIV case, and the Universal occurrence may appear to be indistinguishable seeing that they each conclude we are not brains in vats; in any case, every stipulation joins an alternate significance of "vat." The "vat" utilized in the Universal example speaks to a dark term between the initial two specified occasions (i.e. Substantial world and BIV case); the Tangible "vat" speaks to vats from the unmistakable world similarly as we would see it today; and the BIV "vat" remains for the virtual vat that the super exceptional PC has made for us with its electric signs. Putnam's blunder happens when he doesn't universalize the vat definition by utilizing the last feeling of the counterfeit vat all through occasion BIV. While somewhat befuddling, it appears Putnam thinks about the occasion (BIV1) since the main time it is genuine is in the last feeling of "vat." Putnam likewise needs to attach this definition to the Tangible world. All things considered, we as a whole live in the substantial world and would need to trust we are not brains in vats while in the unmistakable world. Tragically, utilizing marginally extraordinary definitions amid an endeavor to demonstrate this end hampers the contention. At the end of the day, his contention is either that '(BIV1) infers (BIV2) infers (TC)' or that '(BIV1) suggests (T2) infers (TC); be that as it may, these contentions neglect to remain constant. It is superfluous to consider the two potential outcomes inside and out freely, since they can both be denied on similar criteria. In the case of going from (BIV2) to (TC), or from (BIV1) to (T2), Putnam mentions an objective fact about BIV-vats, and after that uses that to make a claim about Tangible-vats. The genuine explanation, (BIV2) "I am a not a mind in a virtual-vat" neglects to suggest "Not being brains in unmistakable vats." Likewise, (T2) "I am not a cerebrum in a substantial vat" being valid, neglects to take after from (BIV1) "I am a mind in a fake vat" being false. The absence of a steady meaning of "vat" presents one huge hindrance for Putnam; in any case, on the off chance that you keep up a specific level of what establishes "vat," the contention still stays invalid and keeps running into different issues which I won't address here. I have endeavored to contend that one can't get to (TC) from (BIV1); in any case, any individual who buys in to Putnam's contention against>GET ANSWER