1) What does Craigie say about clarity of intention, compassion and presence and what is the impact on healing?
2) What approach to nurturing qualities of healing intention and presence resonate with you, and your interest in advanced practice nursing?
3) As presented in Ch. 2, Craigie proposes 4 reasons why spirituality is important to health and wellness care. What are your thoughts on application of spiritual inventory and/or conversation? What resonates with you and your practice? Is there a practical approach that you prefer?
1) What are your thoughts on the Collaborative Spiritual Care Conversations presented in Craigie?
2) Do you think this conversation framework to possibly be applicable in your practice?
3) What do you perceive as challenges with the conversation, and where do you see your competencies?
Property Law – Rights of a Tenant Disclaimer: This work has been put together by an understudy. This isn't a case of the work composed by our expert scholastic authors. You can see tests of our expert work here. Any sentiments, discoveries, ends or proposals communicated in this material are those of the writers and don't really mirror the perspectives of UK Essays. Distributed: Tue, 21 Aug 2018 Section 1 In this situation, Raj has permitted his sister-in-law, Joyce, to live in his property. The inquiry is whether Joyce appreciates the privileges of an inhabitant, or on the off chance that she is really an insignificant licensee. There is, in English property law, a vital qualification between the inhabitant and the licensee; the previous appreciating fundamentally more prominent and more secure rights than the last mentioned. It is regularly not, be that as it may, an obvious refinement. In the present case, the terms of the occupation assention that the gatherings attracted up should be considered. Right off the bat, the archive itself should be considered. The principal term of it explicitly expresses that Joyce is living in Raj's home as a licensee, and not as an inhabitant or tenant (that will be, that no rent has been made). The record itself, in any case, may well speak to an agreement, which would place Joyce in the situation of a legally binding licensee (following such cases as R v Tao (1977) ). Indeed, even an authoritative licensee, in any case, appreciates no exclusive enthusiasm for the property being referred to, as was prove on account of Ashburn Anstaldt v Arnold (1989). A legally binding permit can be differentiated to an uncovered permit, or, in other words close to home consent, conceded for this situation by Raj to Joyce, without Joyce paying thought, for her to enter his property. The motivation behind the uncovered permit is to give a safeguard against a claim of trespass, inasmuch as the licensee does not violate the authorization of the permit, as occurred on account of Tomlinson v Congleton Borough Council (2003). A legally binding permit, by differentiation, must include (as in any agreement) profitable thought moving from the licensee. This was set up by Megaw LJ in Horrocks v Forray (1976). Joyce pays a month to month lease of £600 to Raj, and this could well qualify as the thought put the permit concurrence on an authoritative balance. The second term of the occupation assention expresses that Raj can assign an outsider to impart the premises to Joyce. This identifies with the issue of restrictive ownership, or, in other words component of any rent or tenure. This was portrayed as "the correct touchstone" of a rent by Windeyer J in Radaich v Smith (1959). Two fundamental cases featured this qualification among leases and licenses. In Street v Mountford (1985), Lord Templeman expressed that an occupant is entitled "to keep out outsiders and keep out the landowner except if the proprietor is practicing constrained rights saved to him by the tenure consent to enter and view and repair." In AG Securities v Vaughan (1990), in any case, it was held that a licensee has "no legitimate title which will allow him to bar different people". The assention in the present case explicitly takes into consideration Raj to introduce an outsider at his desire. This unquestionably contends unequivocally against something besides a permit overseeing the circumstance. Certain components, in any case, propose that it isn't such a straightforward instance of Joyce being only a licensee. She pays an intermittent month to month lease of £600, and the occupation understanding states that she will live there for a settled term of four years initiating 1 October 2005. To come back to Street v Mountford (1985), the House of Lords, all things considered, recognized three innate parts of a rent or occupancy. The first was select ownership, which has been examined as of now, and which isn't clearly in proof for this situation. The second, in any case, is that the rent or tenure must be conceded for a settled or occasional term certain. This implies the most extreme length of the rent or occupancy must be plainly ascertainable from the beginning. Despite the fact that the strict utilization of this govern was loose to some degree, the guideline was reaffirmed in Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v London Residuary Board (1992). The 2005 understanding that conceded Joyce the privilege to live in Raj's home obviously distinguished a term of four years after which the privilege would terminate. In this regard, at that point, no doubt the course of action all the more intently looks like a rent. This is additionally a trademark, in any case, of the authoritative permit. The third component recognized in Street v Mountford was the thought that was talked about above. This excessively would propose the course of action is more similar to a rent, or if nothing else a legally binding permit, than an uncovered permit. It appears, at that point, that despite the fact that the game plan shares a portion of the attributes of a rent, the rights delighted in by Joyce are, truth be told, just those of the licensee; that is, a man whose nearness is just grounded upon the individual authorization of the licensor. Joyce's position is more grounded than that of an uncovered licensee, in any case, by ethicalness of the legally binding course of action. A further obscuring of the points of confinement here exists between authoritative licenses and fair or estoppel-based permit, which has progressively moved toward becoming proprietorial in character. A legally binding permit does not, be that as it may, give any proprietorial enthusiasm on the licensee, as was shown in Cowell v Rosehill Racecourse Co Ltd (1937) by Latham CJ who expressed that "fifty thousand individuals who pay to see a football coordinate don't acquire fifty thousand interests in the football ground." A more extended authoritative permit, be that as it may, for example, the one appreciated by Joyce, for a time of four years, starts to look like a restrictive enthusiasm for Raj's property, regardless of the nonappearance of a privilege of select ownership. It is in connection to this last region that the unequivocal factor is generally applicable. That factor is that while deciding if Joyce's inhabitance is an occupancy or a permit, the gatherings' aims (which were unmistakably that a negligible permit ought to be allowed to Joyce) are to a great extent unimportant. In Aslan v Murphy (1990), the court found that its errand was to "find out the genuine deal between the gatherings". An essential instance of significance to the present one was that of Addiscombe Garden Estates Limited v Crabbe (1958), in which a game plan which implied to be a permit was in actuality held to be a rent. In spite of the way that Raj and Joyce obviously planned the inhabitance to be based on a permit, and the legally binding assention was named as a permit, the court is at freedom to upset this if actually Joyce appreciates a rent. It appears to be impossible, in any case, in view of specific terms of the understanding, that Joyce appreciates an adequate proprietorial enthusiasm for the property to wind up a tenant or occupant; yet rather her position looks like that of a legally binding (instead of an uncovered) licensee. Section 2 Segment 11 of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 identifies with the repairing commitments in short rents. Quickly, it obliges the lessor (that is, the gathering owning the more prominent home, for the most part the freehold, out of which the rent has been carced) to embrace certain works and repairs to guarantee that the property stays in great working request. A precedent is the commitment on the lessor to "keep in repair the structure and outside of the residence house (counting channels, canals and outer funnels)". As of late, this area has been considered in various cases. A vital case in the advancement of property law was Bruton v London Quadrant Housing Trust (1999). The importance of segment 11 to this case was that the petitioner (or offended party as he at that point might have been) guaranteed that he was a tenant of the property being referred to, which was possessed by the Trust. Obviously, in the event that he was an insignificant licensee, he would not profit by the statutory assurance managed by the Act. The region court found that he was a licensee and there was in this manner no rupture of area 11. The House of Lords toppled this, in any case. Along these lines, in Sykes v Harry (2001), the area was considered once more. In this specific situation, the issue considered by the court at first occurrence (and along these lines re-considered by the Court of Appeal was whether the proprietor's (that is the lessor's) statutory obligation under segment 11 identifying with the repair of properties subject to a short rent was co-broad with the landowner's legally binding obligation to keep in repair (that is, the commitment made by the rent instrument). Potter LJ expressed that there is "suggested into the occupancy a pledge by the inhabitant that the landowner may, at sensible occasions of day, and on 24 hours composed notice, enter the premises to view their condition and condition of repair." Although at first case the judge had discovered that the proprietor's obligation to take care had been coextensive with the legally binding obligation of repair, the Court of Appeal toppled this utilizing segment 4 of the Defective Premises Act 1972, and the obligations forced on the landowner under this as the primary factor. Soon thereafter, in Southwark London Borough Council v McIntosh (2001), area 11 was by and by under the watchful eye of the court. Here the property being referred to, which was claimed by the chamber, wound up damaged because of the impacts of extreme soggy. The inquiry under the steady gaze of the court was whether the proprietor (the board) was in rupture of its area 11 obligation of repair. The proprietor requested against a first occurrence choice that it was in break, and the High Court said that the inhabitant had neglected to build up adequate proof such that the clammy had been caused by the landowner's rupture of its segment 11 obligations. Accordingly, there was no risk and the interest was permitted. In Shine v English Churches Housing Group (2004), the subject of harms granted under segment 11 was considered. The primary occurrence judge had granted harms to the inhabitant because of the proprietor's break of area 11, however the Court of Appeal found these harms to>GET ANSWER