Why are certain procedures necessary? What will this procedure do? These are questions often asked when one is made aware that they or some they know will have to have a procedure performed Some procedures are used to remove something from the body such as a hysterectomy, where the uterus is removed or lesionectomy, where removal of brain lesions is performed Some procedures are used to alter the human body such as an abdominoplasty, which is a tummy tuck, or trigger point injection (TPI), where medication is injected directly into the skeletal muscle. These terms can be very confusing. You can leam procedure terms much like you would general medical terminology. You can break the word down into the prefix, root, and suffix. When you begin coding you will have to know how to look these terms up in your ICD1O-PCS (for inpatients), Healthcare Common Procedure Coding System (HCPCS) level I, or Current Procedural Terminology (CPT) books. This is why it is important to know what to look for and apply. Let’s take the hysterectomy as an example. The breakdown of the word would be (see coding corner for codes): Prefix/Root = Hyster/o = womb (uterus) Suffix = ectomy = surgical removal of organ In this discussion you will complete the Game Show activity (Note: Your score is not part of your discussion grade). Take note of some of the terms that you are given during the game and their definitions. After the game: • Select five terms and provide an example of the procedural term. (Example: Fragmentation, the breaking down of solid matter in a body part into pieces. An example of fragmentation is extracorporeal shockwave lithotripsy.) What body part is affected by this procedure? What will the procedure accomplish? How will the procedure be performed? What are the major parts of the term (prefix/root/suffix)? • Identify and summarize one article that was published within two years of the start of this course and addresses the terminology of procedural terms. What procedure term was addressed in the articles? How was the term addressed? What are the key concepts of the article?
In Hilary Putnam's Brain-in-a-tank (BIV) model, a world exists in which minds, a neuroscientist, a supercomputer running reenactments of cerebrums contained in a tank, and the tank itself are the main articles. These things have either dependably existed or showed up totally haphazardly with every thing in a similar state (i.e. PCs running reproductions, minds are in tanks, and so on.) Understanding this, envision the accompanying situation: You are the shrewd researcher who screens BIV's and the encounters they get from the PCs. You guarantee that all the BIV's associated trust they are carrying on with a practical life in Springfield, Illinois. One of your BIV's is code-named "The Chancellor." After some time passes, the Chancellor essentially expresses the expression "I realize I am only a mind in-a-tank," which he accepts to be valid, and afterward proceeds with his customized capacities. The BIV situation Putnam presents is one such contention setting the distrustful speculation. Much like the Descartes' Evil Genius, the incredulous speculation calls into uncertainty one's information of the outer world. While the Evil Genius depends on an incomparable misleading divinity, Putnam's BIV contemplates the impacts of a crazy lab rat utilizing PCs to incite deceptive recognitions and encounters. Customary cynics battle we can't observe the BIV theory as false; if we somehow managed to concede the BIV premises as obvious, at that point our encounters would seem just they by and by do (Stanford 2009). Subsequently, cynics keep up that we come up short on the capacity to know anything about the world outside to us. Putnam applies his semantic externalism and thusly considers the situation with the Chancellor unimaginable. Semantic externalism is a type of externalism where "implications and truth states of one's sentences, and the substance of one's deliberate mental states, rely on the character of one's outside, causal condition" (Stanford 2009). All the more accurately, he centers his worry to the primary individual sentence, "I am a mind in-a-tank" to show that an occasion in which the Chancellor verbally expressed said state is essentially false. Therefore, Putnam concludes that we mustn't be BIVs. I will contend that Putnam abuses the meaning of "tank" in his mind in-a-tank analyze, along these lines diminishing his probability of negating the wary speculation. In this paper, I will characterize semantic externalism, trailed by Putnam's utilization of it against three distinctive BIV situations. If we somehow happened to acknowledge semantic externalism, at that point we would fundamentally recognize that how we characterize a term isn't the sole factor in choosing what the word intends to us. A typical precedent would be the examination of a well-known substance (e.g. water) and how its importance would stay steady even before experiencing it. All the more decisively, the individuals who hold fast to semantic externalism would see "water" as a term credited to a substance with a compound piece of H2O before researchers had perceived the atoms including it; be that as it may, the arrangement of this substance we had named "water" did, to some degree, add to our significance (DeRose 102). For Putnam, collaboration with things on the planet speaks to the outside factor. For instance, consider two individuals who have the equivalent mental states and after that begin connecting with substances which are cosmetically comparable while still made out of various atoms. Maybe one individual interfaces solely with Ag (silver), and alternate collaborates just with ABC, yet both take in "silver" to allude to every one of their separate substances. Thus, every individual would have the equivalent mental states (wants, convictions, volitions, and so on.), however with varying in what they reference; "silver" would mean Ag for one, and ABC for the other. With the goal for Putnam to interface semantic externalism to his BIV analyze, he starts by taking note of that it is important to recognize that any enunciation of the sentence "I am a cerebrum in-a-tank" seems, by all accounts, to be self-negating. All the more definitely, if we somehow happened to keep up this sentence to be valid, the sentence would even now infer a false end since we couldn't state "I am a cerebrum in-a-tank" and realize that I am in such a state. Take for instance the announcement "[t]here is no clear explanation." If you see this announcement as evident, it would need to be false in light of the fact that it is a positive articulation. On the off chance that you placed the announcement to be false, the appropriate response is still false. To show how this identifies with Putnam's BIV's, first expect that we really exist in the substantial world (T) similarly as normally held, rather than in tanks (occurrence T, where T is the Tangible world.) We have the accompanying: (T1) If I live in a Tangible world, I am not a "Mind in-a-tank." (T2) In case T, I live in a substantial world. (TC) I am not a "Cerebrum in-a-tank" (True)(T1, T2) I am not a BIV. (TC) Next, consider we are presently the cerebrums in the tanks an alternate (case BIV). In this case BIV, a mind boggling registering framework ceaselessly bolsters us wonderful encounters. Along these lines, we currently have the convoluted figuring framework sending us signals for us to develop our encounters. Presently we have an alternate issue in case BIV: (BIV1)If I am a real BIV, a PC is sending me amazing encounters. (BIV2) I am a real BIV. (BIV3)A PC is sending me extraordinary encounters. (BIV1, BIV2) (BIV4)If I articulate "I am a BIV", I am a mind in-a-tank. (False, BIV3) (BIVC) "I am not a mind in-a-tank" (True) (BIV1, BIV2, BIV3, BIV4) In this way, "I am not a mind in-a-tank" (BIVC) To clear up, semantic externalism infers that the subject will never cooperate with the Tangible tanks on the planet. Along these lines, when the Chancellor emphasizes "tank," he doesn't mean unmistakable tanks, yet rather the starting point of these electric driving forces. All the more definitely, when he says "tank" he implies fake tanks since he really cooperated with a PC program. In the event that the Chancellor was alluding to a cerebrum in the example BIV, that mind would allude the electrical motivations sent from the PC as counterfeit tanks. In this manner, we touch base at the accompanying situation: (BIV1) "I am a mind in-a-tank" (False); (BIV1) infers (BIV2) "I am not a cerebrum in-a-tank" (True) (BIV1, BIV2) infers we are not cerebrums in tanks. Subsequently, the thought that "I am a cerebrum in-a-tank" seems, by all accounts, to be a self-disproving as indicated by Putnam. After Putnam trusts he has built up this self-invalidation, he should shape a nonexclusive (i.e. all around material) contention (U). Henceforth, the accompanying example: Emphasis of (U1) "I am a cerebrum in-a-tank" (false, essentially); (U2) "I am not a mind in-a-tank" (from U1)(true, essentially) (UC)If I am not a mind in-a-tank, at that point we are not cerebrums in tanks. We are not minds in tanks. (UC) The articulating of "I am a cerebrum in-a-tank" must be false since the case BIV infers that we are not minds in tanks. Subsequently, we mustn't be minds in tanks as indicated by this rationale. While at first glance this may appear to be sound, I mean to demonstrate how Putnam may have come up short. At first look, the rationale behind the Tangible world case, the BIV occurrence, and the Universal example may appear to be indistinguishable seeing that they each find we are not cerebrums in tanks; notwithstanding, every stipulation consolidates an alternate importance of "tank." The "tank" utilized in the Universal occasion speaks to a dark term between the initial two referenced cases (i.e. Unmistakable world and BIV occurrence); the Tangible "tank" speaks to tanks from the substantial world similarly as we would see it today; and the BIV "tank" represents the virtual tank that the super wonderful PC has made for us with its electric signs. Putnam's blunder happens when he doesn't universalize the tank definition by utilizing the last feeling of the fake tank all through case BIV. While somewhat confounding, it appears Putnam thinks about the occasion (BIV1) since the main time it is genuine is in the last feeling of "tank." Putnam likewise needs to attach this definition to the Tangible world. All things considered, we as a whole live in the unmistakable world and would need to trust we are not cerebrums in tanks while in the substantial world. Shockingly, utilizing somewhat extraordinary definitions amid an endeavor to demonstrate this end hampers the contention. As it were, his contention is either that '(BIV1) suggests (BIV2) infers (TC)' or that '(BIV1) infers (T2) infers (TC); in any case, these contentions neglect to remain constant. It is superfluous to consider the two potential outcomes inside and out autonomously, since they can both be denied on similar criteria. In the case of going from (BIV2) to (TC), or from (BIV1) to (T2), Putnam mentions an objective fact about BIV-tanks, and afterward utilizes that to make a case about Tangible-tanks. The genuine articulation, (BIV2) "I am a not a mind in a virtual-tank" neglects to suggest "Not being cerebrums in substantial tanks." Likewise, (T2) "I am not a cerebrum in an unmistakable tank" being valid, neglects to pursue from (BIV1) "I am a mind in a fake tank" being false. The absence of a consistent meaning of "tank" presents one huge hindrance for Putnam; in any case, on the off chance that you keep up a specific level of what comprises "tank," the contention still stays invalid and keeps running into different issues which I won't address here. I have endeavored to contend that one can't get to (TC) from (BIV1); be that as it may, any individual who buys in to Putnam's contention against minds in-tanks may contend the inverse. It is vital to perceive the conditions encompassing the contention. All the more unequivocally, Putnam assumes we live in the characteristic world. The cynic's principle contention is that we do not have the information to perceive regardless of whether we exist as minds in tanks. We would just have the capacity to separate between the examples and the tank use on the off chance that we new conclusively which occurrences were being referenced. >GET ANSWER