Readiness was defined as being fully prepared to execute the two-war scenario, although after 1989 the rising requirement was for a capacity to handle frequent and multiple smaller-scale contingencies of a complex sort: not just traditional combat missions, but also non-traditional missions, including stability and humanitarian operations. Despite that, during the 1990s the lion’s share of the military’s time and resources was devoted to ‘traditional’ activities and threats. The vaunted ‘two-war strategy’ made claims on almost all of America’s conventional assets; it dominated planning, training, and procurement. By the decade’s end, ‘operations other than war – especially peace, stability, and humanitarian operations – were considered anathema.28 Baseline is that the military was expected to wage a major war (or two) against raising peer competitors, and no connection with democratic governance was established. In reality, the Clinton’s administration in the 1990s was involved in many peacekeeping or humanitarian interventions, within the UN framework or without it. Since Korea, the U.S. military has resisted performing police duties. However, it become obvious that the security gaps created during various international missions required putting boots on the ground, as actual security threats could not be eliminated by high-tech equipment pilled under the pressure of defense industry and Cold War era military officers’ mentality. The Americans had to press its European allies to provide police and constabulary forces for the growing number of missions, and frequently faced with difficulties. In 1997, the Clinton administration began an interagency effort to analyze and learn from the experience of the peace operations. The National Security Council (NSC) requested from the Office of the Secretary of Defense to prepare the first draft of a Presidential Decision Directive on international police and judicial assistance in countries emerging from ethnic conflict to find ways in which the United States could improve its capacity and that of the United Nations to rapidly deploy effective civilian police forces and rebuild criminal justice system during peace operations.29 U.S. military leaders believed that peace operations dull combat skills, expend resources, and reduce readiness; in addition, soldiers were neither trained nor equipped to deal with civilians. This predilection to avoid ‘nation building’ was reinforced by the traumatic experience of Somalia. At the Pentagon, the majority view was that discussions on this topic were to be avoided, stressing a myriad of problems and uncertainties involving legal authority, funding, administrative restrictions, and interagency differences.30 But the assignment went to Office of Peacekeeping and Humanita>