Perception, Bias, and the Cuban Missile Crisis

Paper that addresses the cognitive shortfalls associated with “Operation Anadyr”:

Introduction

The Cuban Missile Crisis was a 13-day confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union in October 1962, during the Cold War. The crisis was caused by the installation of Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba, just 90 miles from the coast of Florida. The United States was concerned that the missiles would give the Soviet Union the ability to launch a nuclear attack on the United States without warning.

The purpose of this paper is to identify any cognitive shortfalls associated with individual or group perception, memory, analysis, or biases associated with “Operation Anadyr.” The paper will first briefly summarize the key events associated with the Cuban Missile Crisis. Then, the paper will identify two specific instances where US political or military personnel mistakenly perceived the build-up to the crisis, the Soviet’s ability to successfully place nuclear weapons in Cuba, and the Soviet’s response to the crisis. The paper will then identify two specific instances where US political or military personnel allowed a cognitive bias to influence their assessment/judgment in relation to the build-up to the crisis, the Soviet’s ability to successfully place nuclear weapons in Cuba, and the Soviet’s response to the crisis. Finally, the paper will identify two missed indicators that the US could have used to prevent the Soviets from placing weapons in Cuba.

Perceiving the Build-Up to and Eventual Crisis

One cognitive shortfall that occurred during the Cuban Missile Crisis was the tendency for US political and military personnel to overestimate the Soviet threat. This overestimation led to a number of mistakes, including the failure to anticipate the Soviet deployment of nuclear missiles in Cuba.

Another cognitive shortfall that occurred during the Cuban Missile Crisis was the tendency for US personnel to focus on the most recent information and to ignore information that contradicted their existing beliefs. This tendency led to the US misinterpreting Soviet signals and to underestimating the Soviet commitment to Cuba.

Cognitive Biases

Two cognitive biases that influenced US decision-making during the Cuban Missile Crisis were the availability heuristic and confirmation bias. The availability heuristic is the tendency to judge the likelihood of an event based on how easily examples of that event come to mind. In the case of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the availability heuristic led US officials to overestimate the likelihood of a Soviet attack.

Confirmation bias is the tendency to seek out information that confirms our existing beliefs and to ignore information that contradicts those beliefs. In the case of the Cuban Missile Crisis, confirmation bias led US officials to interpret ambiguous evidence as confirmation of their belief that the Soviets were planning an attack.

Missed Indicators

There were a number of missed indicators that the US could have used to prevent the Soviets from placing weapons in Cuba. One missed indicator was the increase in Soviet military activity in the Caribbean in the months leading up to the crisis. Another missed indicator was the discovery of Soviet submarines off the coast of Cuba in September 1962.

Conclusion

The cognitive shortfalls that occurred during the Cuban Missile Crisis had a significant impact on the course of the crisis. These shortfalls led to the US overestimating the Soviet threat, misinterpreting Soviet signals, and underestimating the Soviet commitment to Cuba. These shortfalls also led the US to miss a number of opportunities to prevent the Soviets from placing weapons in Cuba.

Bibliography

• Allison, Graham T. Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. Boston: Little, Brown, 1971.
• Freedman, Lawrence. The Cold War: A New History. New York: Basic Books, 2007.
• McGeorge Bundy. Danger and Survival: Choices about the Bomb in the First Fifty Years. New York: Random House, 1988.