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pinions regarding the Arab – Israeli conflict can be complex and multidimensional. Just within a country there exists varying levels of opinion. These include individual sentiments, institutional views, and normally an official foreign policy. Moreover, opinions on the conflict may be influenced by numerous factors such as; economics, religious/ethnic background, or morals. In a case such as the Arab – Israeli conflict, a significant question a country ponders when determining their foreign policy includes: what is there to gain or lose from taking a certain position? Further, they may ask: what position can be taken to maximize beneficial outcomes for our country? The term for this theoretical approach to foreign policy making is called “realism.” A core tenant of realism is concerned with achieving national interests, which essentially are a country’s goals and ambitions whether economic, military, increased influence, etc. In this paper, my aim is to examine the many approaches Canada has taken towards the Arab – Israeli conflict. To specify, this paper chronologically observes Canada’s evolving foreign policy from 1939 to 2014. Further, I argue that for the majority of this time, Canada’s foreign policy towards the conflict has been dictated by realism, or achieving Canadian national interests. There was a distinct shift in foreign policy during the years Paul Martin and Stephen Harper stood as Prime Minister. Rather than following Canada’s official position, they allowed personal values to dictate the Canadian approach; ultimately to the detriment of national interests. The paper concludes with my take on how the current Liberal should approach the conflict given the current turbulent state of affairs. Structure First however, it is important for contextual purposes to understand the structure of this paper. In addition to being chronological, the paper follows another pattern that methodically illustrates Canada’s approaches towards the conflict. In each section, a particular time period is specified. Each time period represents a new approach, in which the particular national interest(s) of that time are defined. In conjunction with the definition, the paper shows how each approach, in practice, served the national interest. There are three of these sections: 1939 – 1947, 1948 – 1967, and 1968 – 2003. While remaining explanatory in nature, the paper deviates slightly from the pattern starting with the shift in foreign policy during the Martin – Harper years (2004 – 2015). In the fourth section, the suspected reasoning for the change in approach is explained, followed by how it negatively affected the country. The final section consists of normative analysis. I briefly outline the current state of the Arab – Israeli conflict, while offering the reader how I believe the Canadian government should approach it. 1939 – 1947: Canadian Hesitancy During the Second World War, Canada displayed its effectiveness as a middle power ally of Western forces. The existing superpower of Britain, as well as the emerging superpower United States, recognized Canadian war efforts. As a result, their international standing began to rise. Using this reputable status, Canada dedicated itself to the United Nations (UN). Even as a middle power, the UN allowed Canada to have above average influence in the international sphere. Furthermore, it was Prime Minster (PM) Mackenzie King’s belief that it was in the Canadian national interest to maintain good relations with both the United States and Great Britain. So how does this relate to the Arab – Israeli conflict? Shortly after the Second World War ended, Britain, who had largely been handling the ongoing Arab – Israeli conflict, handed control over to the United Nations. In doing so, this created the first instance whereby Canada was obliged to have an opinion regarding the conflict. Meanwhile. the post-war government considered the conflict to be insignificant in terms of directly affecting Canadian foreign policy. During this time, Canada had little economic or strategic ties to the Israeli’s and Arab countries. Moreover, Canada’s economy, while budding, was not particularly robust; making any commitments to the conflict an unnecessary financial burden. Nevertheless, Canada had a vested interest in appeasing the UN>GET ANSWER