What preconceptions and prejudices did Shari Caudron have before she met the Barbie collectors and how did her preconceptions and prejudices change after she spent time with the Barbie collectors? Discuss these questions in a comparison/contrast essay of 1000 words.
As per Aristotle, people's most elevated great includes the quest for getting satisfaction from living and thinking admirably. To this end, Aristotle legitimizes this specific claim through clarifying: "the main great is clearly something last. Presently we call what is in itself deserving of interest more last than that which is deserving of interest for something different. Presently a wonder such as this is satisfaction, for this we pick dependably for itself" (Aristotle 570R/571L). In this light, Aristotle's contention here is that the most elevated great must be what is accomplished through completing something which is deserving of realizing all by itself, and for Aristotle nothing fits this portrayal superior to that of satisfaction, regardless of whether such bliss be gotten from hypothetical or down to earth interests. Then again, the Socrates of Plato's Crito adopts a marginally extraordinary strategy to the most astounding goodness. At the start of Crito, Socrates comments that "the great life, the lovely life, and the fair life are the same" (Plato 42R). To this end, the most noteworthy useful for Socrates includes living capably and insightfully consistently and paying little heed to the setting of one's conditions. Socrates puts this thought of the most elevated goodness vigorously by declining to escape his capital punishment in Athens. Socrates makes the contention that in being an Athenian national, he has guaranteed to take after the decisions of Athenian law, in any case if such a law is utilized to sentence him to death. With regards to his obligation to the run of law, Socrates moans about us to "not esteem either your kids or your life or whatever else more than goodness," (Plato 46L) or, different words, living mindfully and dependably. In measuring both of these contentions for the most elevated great against each other, I should state that while I don't intrinsically differ with Socrates' contention, I discover Aristotle's record of the most noteworthy great to be all the more convincing. This is on account of in Plato's Crito Socrates just dubiously spreads out a general philosophical origination of living a decent life, though in Aristotle's own origination of the most noteworthy great he spreads out an organized contention for what such goodness involves, to be specific that the most astounding great must be something which is deserving of seeking after for itself, which for Aristotle is typified in the realization of bliss. In this light, I discover Aristotle's record of goodness more convincing than Socrates' record since it is organized in an unmistakable and consistent way. In spite of the fact that I will likewise qualify my comments by saying that I do by and large identify with Socrates' origination of goodness; I simply think that its less convincing than Aristotle's contending origination. Gathering II: Metaphysics (#4) Holy person Anselm contends for the presence of god on the premise that god is "something â€¦ [of] which nothing more noteworthy can be considered," and consequently as per this line of thought such a divine being "can't exist just in the comprehension, [because] we could imagine it to exist as a general rule as well, in which case it would be more prominent" (Anselm 40R/41L). To this end, Anselm is keeping up that on the off chance that one acknowledges the start that god is "something â€¦ [of] which nothing more noteworthy can be considered," at that point it legitimately takes after that such a divine being must exist, in that the main thing more prominent than having the idea of such a divine being in one's psyche is the truth that that god exists outside of the brain, thusly satisfying Anselm's introduce of god being "something â€¦ [of] which nothing more noteworthy can be imagined" (Anselm 40R). Then again, Saint Aquinas contends for the presence of god on the premise that each reason must have an activity and in this manner that there probably been a first reason that was caused by god, seeing as how, at any rate in Aquinas' eyes, the universe is limited and in that capacity it more likely than not began from a first reason. To this end, Aquinas keeps up that everything has been changed by something different, "However this can't return to unendingness. In the event that it did, there would be no first reason for change and, therefore, no different reasons for change," (Aquinas 43L) implying that without a first reason there would be no universe in any case. In this light, Aquinas sets that the main thing fit for causing the primary reason is god, and hence he bases his contention for god's presence on the possibility that such a divine being would have been important to "cause" a limited universe. From my own particular novice point of view, I discover Aquinas' previously mentioned contention for the presence of god to be more grounded than Anselm's contention. This is on account of Anselm's contention for god's presence appears grounded absolutely in talk and semantics, as though his contention were only a word diversion. Then again, Aquinas' contention for god's presence is grounded in an issue of material science that, shy of present day science, just the presence of a divine being could sensibly resolve. The preface that a limited universe probably had a first reason is a start that for all intents and purposes any individual could without much of a stretch acknowledge. In this manner based on its commence and its legitimate decision, Aquinas' contention for god appears to be more grounded than Anselm's contention. With respect to enticement, Aquinas' contention for god's presence is absolutely influential as in one can't judiciously imagine a limited universe that did not hold up under a first reason, in that such a universe's extremely limit requires an originary causation. Accordingly, shy of having any information of the Big Bag, Aquinas' dispute that god more likely than not caused the main source is a sensible one, as it is hard to think of a thought of whatever other element that could be fit for causing the primary reason. Gathering III: Epistemology (#6) Descartes envisions a "malicious devil" toward the finish of Meditation since he utilizes this idea to represent that most information is questionable and that one must begin from a place of incredulity on the off chance that they are to have the capacity to really locate a dependable establishment for irrefutable learning. To this end, Descartes comments how, in understanding that he would need to begin his quest for learning starting with no outside help, "I would need to tear down everything and start over again from the establishments on the off chance that I needed to set up any firm and enduring information" (Descartes 157L). Accordingly, in conceiving a hypothetical "insidiousness devil" that can delude people into places of false information, Descartes is starting to "tear down everything and start once again" in his quest for "firm and enduring learning" (Descartes 157L). Zhuangzi makes comparative contentions in quest for building up doubt in his own particular grant. For one, Zhuangzi makes the incredulous contention that learning is at last unimaginable in light of the fact that, for him, the separation amongst subjectivity and objectivity can't be survived. He contends such in light of the fact that he keeps up that "Everything is just subjective; there is no such thing as objectivity. So there is no such thing as information" (Zhuangzi 322). In this sense, he sees information as outlandish in light of the fact that people are just equipped for having defective subjective points of view. Working off of this dispute of extreme subjectivity, Zhuangzi makes another doubtful contention based on "general inconstancy," with all inclusive fluctuation being the thought that since everybody sees things in an unexpected way, "There is no real way to choose which recognitions should be trusted," (Zhuangzi 322) which again furnishes us with the suggestion that target learning is inconceivable. The principle comparability between Descartes' wariness and Zhuangzi's suspicion is that the two thinkers influence certain hypothetical contentions keeping in mind the end goal to outline how, by and large (or in all cases for Zhuangzi), what we take to be learning is in truth very deceitful. Then again, the primary contrast between Descartes' suspicion and Zhuangzi's incredulity lies in what both are attempting to accomplish through their incredulous contentions. Descartes' solitary undertakings in doubt with the goal that he can get rid of all false information from his point of view and from that point set up a firm establishment for genuine learning. On the other side, Zhuangzi does not have a helpful end to his incredulity, in that he keeps up his distrustful contentions exclusively to illustrate how there can be no firm establishment for genuine information. In this sense, Descartes' objectives and Zhuangzi's objectives are very extraordinary with regards to incredulity.>GET ANSWER