contexts or channels of communication, such as Twitter. On the other hand, as stated before, North Korea lacks this individual dimension as statements hardly ever come from its leader himself. It terms of projection of power, this clearly states a difference: Donald Trump is a public figure, as the president of the United States but also, as an individual persona with his own opinions. Kim Jong-Un, on the other hand, not only is not separated from his position (he does not have a private channel of communication) but does not appear in the public international scenario. This way, an image of unreachability is portrayed, as if he did not participate directly in this issue. Finally, the channel of communication is also worth mentioning. Donald Trump is an avid Twitter user (36,900 tweets) (Trump, 2018b), which can be used not only as a way of communication but also as a way of portraying influence. The very same act of communicating by social media has a strong connotation in terms of projecting power. In the first place, due to its spontaneous nature, this tool enables to reach a high number of people (Sirin and Villalobos, 2008) in seconds. Most importantly, ‘joint discourse activity…creates and affirmed shared membership in a “community of practice”’ (Wenger in Johnstone, 2002, p.116). Twitter has its own textual conventions. Due to its capacity of reach the public and the brevity of the messages, language tends to be direct and informal. Even though political discourse is ‘highly stylized and predictable most of the time’ (Edelman in Lim, 2008, p. 4), it is highly noticeable how Trump’s discourse through social media is nowhere near traditional presidential rhetoric and his remarks feature almost bantering language. We can see this in the well-known “nuclear button” tweet, where he states that his button ‘is bigger than the North Korean leader’s’ (Trump, 2018b). It would be relevant to think that this is part of a political strategy in the sense that power can be projected by highly intellectual rhetoric but also by disregarding the “formality” aspect expected taking into account the type of interaction (Fairclough, 2001). In simpler words, informal language could be used to downplay North Korean threats. On the other hand, North Korea’s official channel of communication is a perfect example of one of Fairclough’s ideas. He supports that the access to discourse itself is as much of a good as economic wealth (Fairclough, 2001). If one were to access the Korea Central News Agency, it would be impossible to find much information, as access is highly restricted and>