Based on your chosen organization being Amazon:
- Explain any two models of organization culture which would help achieve your
chosen organization’s goals and objectives.
(Assessment Criteria 1.1: Explain how models of organization culture can be
used to achieve organizational objectives).
- Understand your national culture and your chosen organizational culture. Based on
your understanding, explain the difference between the national culture and your
chosen organizational culture.
(Assessment Criteria 1.2: Explain the difference between organizational and
- Analyze the corporate cultural profile of your chosen organization by considering a
minimum of five major key features, as part of the corporate cultural profile.
(Assessment Criteria 1.3: Analyze the corporate cultural profile in an
- Discuss the impact of your chosen organization’s corporate culture in achieving its
(Assessment Criteria 1.4: Discuss the impact of an organization’s corporate
culture in achieving its objectives).
- Evaluate the existing climate of your chosen organization. Your evaluation should also
be based on what your organization wants to achieve in terms of its culture. Thereafter,
recommend ways to improve corporate climate in your organization.
(Assessment Criteria 2.1: Evaluate the existing climate of an organization;
Assessment Criteria 2.2: Recommend ways to improve corporate climate in an
- Understand how the current organizational values of your chosen organization are
linked to the organizational objectives and propose a framework of organizational
values that can meet the specific strategic and operational needs of your chosen
(Assessment Criteria 2.3: Propose a framework of organizational values that
meet the specific strategic and operational needs of an organization).
- Identify internal and external stakeholders of your chosen organization.
Evaluate the effectiveness of your chosen organization’s existing communication
strategies, by discussing its strengths and weaknesses.
Develop new communication strategies for internal and external stakeholders of your
chosen organization that address differences in belief, values, customs and language.
(Assessment Criteria 3.1: Identify internal and external stakeholders of an
organization; Assessment Criteria 3.2: Evaluate the effectiveness of an
organization’s existing communication strategies; Assessment Criteria 3.3:
Develop new communication strategies for stakeholders of an organization that
address differences in belief, values, customs and language).
Institutional holdings have positive effect on firm performance but their active involvement in management has negative effect. Some of the observations state that institutional investors may have significant impact on the governance practices of companies but do not improve financial performance. 2.3 Corporate Governance and Firm Performance Lipton and Lorsch (1992)50 found that limiting board size improves firm performance because the benefits by larger boards of increased monitoring are outweighed by the poorer communication and decision-making of larger groups. Millstein and MacAvoy (1998)51 studied 154 large publicly traded US corporations over a five-year period and found that corporations with active and independent boards appear to have performed much better in the 1990s than those with passive, non-independent boards. Eisenberg et al. (1998)52 found negative correlation between board size and profitability when using sample of small and midsize Finnish firms, which suggests that board-size effects can exist even when there is less separation of ownership and control in these smaller firms. Vafeas (1999)53 found that the annual number of board meeting increases following share price declines and operating performance of firms improves following years of increased board meetings. This suggests meeting frequency is an important dimension of an effective board. Core, Holthausen and Larcker (1999)54 observed that CEO compensation is lower when the CEO and board chair positions are separate. It is further shown that firms are more valuable when the CEO and board chair positions are separate. Botosan and Plumlee (2001)55 found a material effect of expensing stock options on return on assets. They used Fortune’s list of the 100 fastest growing companies and obtained the effect of expensing stock options on firms’ operating performance. Morgan and Poulsen (2001)56 found that pay-for-performance plan generally helps to reduce agency problems in the firm as the votes approving the plan are positively related to firms that have high investment or high growth opportunities. On the other hand, votes approving the plan are inversely related to negative features in some of the plans such as dilution of shareholder stakes. Mitton (2002)57 examined the stock performance of a sample of listed companies from Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand. It reported that performance is better in firms with higher accounting disclosure quality (proxied by the use of Big Six auditors) and higher outside ownership concentration. This provides firm-level evidence consistent with the view that corporate governance helps explain firm performance during a financial crisis. Claessens et al. (2002b)58 observed that firm value increases with the cash-flow ownership (right to receive dividends) of the largest and controlling shareholder, consistent with “incentive” effects. But when the control rights (arising from pyramid structure, cross-holding and dual-class shares) of the controlling shareholder exceed its cash-flow rights, firm value falls, which is consistent with “entrenchment” effects. Deutsche Bank AG (2004a and 2004b)59 explored the implications of corporate governance for portfolio management and concluded that corporate governance standards are an important component of equity risk. Their analysis also showed that for South Africa, Eastern Europe, and the Middle East, the performance differential favored those companies with stronger corporate governance. Fich and Shivdasani (2004)60 based on Fortune 1000 firms, asserted that firms with director stock option plans have higher market to book ratios, higher profitability (as proxied by operating return on assets, return on sales and asset turnover), and they document a positive stock market reaction when firms announce stock option plans for their directors. Gompers et al. (2003)61 examined the ways in which shareholder rights vary across firms. They constructed a ‘Governance Index’ to proxy for the level of shareholder rights in approximately 1500 large firms during the 1990s. An investment strategy that bought firms in the lowest decile of the index (strongest rights) and sold firms in the highest decile of the index (weakest rights) would have earned abnormal returns of 8.5% per year during the sample period. They found that firms with stronger shareholder rights had higher firm value, higher profits, higher sales growth, lower capital expenditures, and made fewer corporate acquisitions. Brown, Robinson and Caylor (2004)62 created a broad measure of corporate governance, Gov-Score, based on a new dataset provided by Institutional Shareholder Se>GET ANSWER