ed on a textual argument that, “The binding nature of a directive, which constitutes the basis for the possibility of relying on the directive before a national court, exists only in relation to ‘each Member State to which it is addressed.’ It follows that directive may not of itself impose obligations on an individual…” The court further confirmed this reading in Dori by establishing that the case law that allows for vertical direct effect of directives cannot be used to support horizontal direct effect because the estoppel argument proposed in Ratti , only seeks to prevent ‘the state’ from taking advantage of its failure to comply with European law. The Court justified its decision using 4 arguments in subsequent jurisprudence. First being the textual argument based on the wording of Article 288 and its interpretation in Marshall . This can be opposed simply, using the Courts disregard for the fact that Treaty articles too are addressed explicitly to Member States in the Defrenne case. The Court dismissed the argument that it can relied upon only against the state. Secondly, the estoppel argument. The Court argued that since individuals were not responsible for the non-implementation of a directive, direct effect should not place an obligation on them. The Court’s actions have not been consistent with this explanation. If we consider cases such as CIA Security and Unilever Italia it is visible that the Court ruled in favour of horizontal direct effect irrespective of its focus on a ‘substantial procedural effect. Thirdly, the Court believes that if horizontal direct effect were given to directives the distinction between regulations and directives would disappear as directives would then have a legal impact despite not being implemented. This argument is unconvincing as not only is this explanation equally true of vertical direct effect and therefore cannot be a ground for distinction between horizontal and vertical effect but more importantly, as recognised by A.G Lenz horizontal direct effect does not interfere with this distinction. Directives still leave Member states their choice of implementation and direct effect comes in only when they fail to implement the directive. Lastly, the court added legal certainty as one of the arguments in the case of Wells . Legal certainty on the surface focuses on the fact that a community norm has to be clear and precise to have the ability to impose an obligation, this condition is met by directives. Legal certainty also requires that directives should be published. Since this argument was proposed when directives were not published it held >