The battle exposed major gaps in mission command doctrine as it was applied on-the-ground during operations against hostile forces in Mogadishu. At its core, mission command relies upon “through understanding” between commander and subordinate elements for successful execution; this requires clear orders that are understood by all involved parties coupled with decentralized execution allowing those closest to the problem solving capability best suited to address specific issues rather than relying solely on top down decision-making processes at HQ level or above (Krause & Williams, 2019). In Mogadishu, Operation Gothic Serpent suffered from a number of factors which undermined effective application of mission command principles: firstly there was significant disagreement amongst senior leadership regarding objectives - specifically whether or not captives should be targeted - leading subordinates to act without clear approval or guidance; secondly there was inadequate intelligence gathering prior to commencement which led towards unrealistic assessment regarding enemy strength and capabilities; thirdly there was no contingency planning prepared should things go wrong leading to chaotic response when faced with unexpected resistance; fourthly communication systems linking field commanders lacked sufficient range thus limiting ability for real time updates back up chain throughout duration operation; fifthly high level decision makers demonstrated a tendency towards “micro managing” their subordinates instead delegating responsibility based upon trust relationships built through previous missions (Krause & Williams, 2019). As result field commanders felt disconnected from higher ups unable trust them make own decisions context operational situation resulting chaotic disorganised battlefield characterised poor discipline ad hoc responses threats encountered ground troops eventually forced withdraw before completion primary objective increasing casualties side. Ultimately The Battle Of Mogadishu highlighted importance correct application doctrine well designed system de-centralized authorisation order execute required missions according conditions encountered field support greater efficiency minimise damage personnel resources failure ensure contribute larger strategic failures inflict ultimate cost population across Middle East region today indicating how critical proper implementation remain future operations succeed both tactically strategically

Sample Solution

The Battle of Mogadishu, fought in 1993 between U.S. forces and Somali militia, is an example of a tactical victory yet operational and strategic failure in regards to mission command doctrinal concept. While the U.S. forces were able to successfully complete their immediate mission objective – extraction of two key lieutenants from the Habr Gidr clan – the wider operation failed due to a lack of effective command, control, and coordination at higher levels within the chain of command.