Frank Jackson’s ‘Epiphenomenal Qualia’ challenges the basic principles of physicalism through the examples of fictional characters named Mary and Fred. Jackson concludes that there are indeed non-physical qualities to experience. In reaching that conclusion, Jackson relies on the Knowledge Argument. The Knowledge Argument, a major component of explaining qualia, provides that complete physical knowledge regarding a conscious being could lack knowledge about “what it’s like” to experience that being. Knowledge of the physical, such as the mechanisms of the brain and the kinds of mental states that exist, does not include comprehensive details of smelling a rose, or, put in the “what it’s like” framework, which is used to support the Knowledge Argument, what it’s like to smell a rose. That is, physical information does not “capture the smell of a rose” (Jackson). Relying on purely physical information is failing to acknowledge that more information can be learned because the information cannot be conceptualized and manifested in terms that most scientific physical information is presented. We know “what it’s like” but cannot accurately and comprehensively describe it in physical terms. Jackson effectively utilizes the example of Mary to create an anti-physicalist, pro-qualia argument. Mary is a neuroscientist who has studied the extended neurophysiology of vision in a black and white room for her entire life. She learns that material on a black and white television screen. She knows the exact wavelength combinations and mechanisms involved in seeing that “the sky is blue” – highly complex scientific information – and claims she knows the same for experiencing the color red. The debate arises when Mary finally leaves the black and white room and actually experiences seeing red for the first time. Will Mary learn something new when sees the color red? The obvious assumption is that Mary will>