Argument:
If God knows that a certain individual will be good or bad, then the individual is compelled to act accordingly.
If God’s knowledge is imperfect, then He does not know if a certain individual will be good or bad.
If God’s knowledge is imperfect, then He is not all-knowing.
If God is all-knowing, then His knowledge is not imperfect.
Therefore, if God is all-knowing, then a certain individual is compelled to act accordingly.
It is not the case that a certain individual is compelled to act accordingly.
Therefore, it is not the case that God is all-knowing.
Explanation:
The first premise assumes that if God possesses knowledge about an individual’s actions in advance, then that individual is compelled to act in accordance with that foreknowledge. This premise implies that individuals have no free will and are determined by God’s knowledge.
The second premise suggests that if God’s knowledge is imperfect, meaning that He does not know the future actions of individuals, then it follows that He is not all-knowing. This premise is based on the assumption that perfect knowledge includes knowledge of all future events.
The third premise follows from the second premise and states that if God’s knowledge is imperfect, meaning He does not possess knowledge of all future events, then He cannot be considered all-knowing. This premise is based on the conventional understanding of God’s omniscience.
The fourth premise builds on the third premise and asserts that if God is all-knowing, then His knowledge cannot be imperfect. This premise maintains that God’s omniscience necessitates complete knowledge of all things, including future events.
The fifth premise draws a conclusion from the previous premises and states that if God is all-knowing, then individuals are compelled to act in accordance with His foreknowledge. This conclusion follows from the assumption that God’s knowledge of future actions is complete and determinative.
The sixth premise denies the claim made in the fifth premise, asserting that individuals are not compelled to act in accordance with God’s foreknowledge. This premise suggests the existence of human free will and the ability to make choices independent of God’s knowledge.
The final conclusion is derived from the previous premises and states that if individuals are not compelled to act in accordance with God’s foreknowledge, then God cannot be considered all-knowing. This conclusion challenges the traditional concept of God’s omniscience.
Critical Evaluation:
One objection to this argument is that it assumes a deterministic view of the relationship between God’s knowledge and human actions. It assumes that if God knows an individual’s actions in advance, then those actions are predetermined and the individual is compelled to act accordingly. However, this objection raises the question of whether God’s foreknowledge necessarily eliminates human free will.
Another objection is that the argument relies on a limited understanding of God’s omniscience. It assumes that God’s knowledge must be complete and comprehensive, including knowledge of all future events. However, it is possible to conceive of God’s knowledge as being more nuanced, encompassing a deep understanding of human nature and the ability to anticipate and respond to human choices without undermining free will.
Additionally, the argument does not consider the possibility of God’s transcendence beyond the constraints of time. If God exists outside of time, then His knowledge of future events does not necessarily imply determinism or compulsion. It is conceivable that God’s knowledge of future actions coexists with human free will, allowing individuals to make choices while still being within the scope of God’s knowledge.
In conclusion, the argument presented makes assumptions about the relationship between God’s knowledge and human actions, as well as the nature of God’s omniscience. By considering alternative perspectives on free will and God’s knowledge, it becomes evident that the argument is not conclusive in establishing that God’s knowledge necessarily leads to determinism or undermines human agency.
