eed and fell in line “with Ulane and the vast majority of federal courts to have addressed this issue and concluded discrimination against a transgender based on the person’s status as a transsexual is not discrimination because of sex under Title VII.” Etsitty at 1221. After the Supreme Court interpreted Title VII in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the 6th Circuit in Smith v. City of Salem argued that the reasoning of Ulane and its progeny, that “sex” meant only biological sex, is superseded by Price Waterhouse. However, Sweet v. Mulberry Lutheran Home, shows this is not the case: “Long after Price Waterhouse was decided, courts have continued to hold that discrimination on the basis of sexual preference or orientation is not actionable under Title VII because it is not discrimination based on a person’s sex.” See also Creed v. Family Express Corp. (the net effect of Price Waterhouse is it appears that the holding in Ulane—that discrimination against transgenders because they are transgenders isn’t discrimination “because of … sex”—remains “controlling law.”). Furthermore, the D.C Circuit in Schroer v. Billington held that transgender individuals are protected under Title VII on public policy grounds but conceded that Price WaterHouse does not apply to transgender individuals. Ms. Schroer applied for and was hired as a Terrorism Research Analyst while still appearing as a man. Upon informing her supervisor of her plan to transition sexes, her offer was rescinded. The D.C Circuit rejected the application of Price Waterhouse in Smith v. City of Salem, arguing, “protection against sex stereotyping is different, not in degree, but in kind, from protecting men, whether effeminate or not, who seek to present themselves as women.” The opinion stated, Ms. Schroer was seeking recognition not as a feminine man, but as a traditional woman. The court held that Price Waterhouse was not applicable because Ms. Schroer’s intent was not to “transgress stereotypes,” but to adopt an entirely new gender and conform to its stereotypes. Therefore, both sides of the Circuit Split offer support that Ulane and its progeny are still good law. Under the Ulane analysis, Plaintiff’s claim for sexual stereotyping discrimination under Title VII fails as a matter of law and should be dismissed. 1. The plain language and the legislative history of Title VII exemplify Congress’s intent to not include transgender as a protected class. Prior to the 1990s, not a single court found transgender plaintiffs protected under Title VII or similar state laws . After Price Waterhouse, there was an increase of people publicly acknowledging sexual orientation or gender or sexual identity issues. However, the word “sex” in Title VII has never be>