Think about middle and high school teachers (no names please) you had who were effective and/or ineffective. What strategies did the teachers use that engaged or disengaged students?
The Euthyphro problem has been central to the discussion about morality and its relationship with God. We will first outline the dilemma before presenting problems with both sides. Ultimately, this essay will argue that the second hornist’s position, that God wills things because they are good, is the stronger but that the conception of God that this view entails is still a somewhat unsatisfactory one. Plato outlines the problem neatly in his dialogue between Socrates and Euthyphro. In discussing what it is that makes an action holy- here, specifically the holiness or sinfulness of Euthyphro prosecuting his own father for murdering a murderer- they seem to arrive at a fairly intuitive general definition. After overcoming the initial stumbling block of their society having multiple bickering gods, Euthyphro agrees that “whatever all the gods love is holy, and that whatever they all hate is sinful”1 (Euthyphro, Plato). Here, ‘holiness’ and ‘sinfulness’ can be used interchangeably with ‘good’ and ‘bad’. However, Socrates draws out a problem with this standard: “We talk about things that carry, and things that are carried, things that see and things that are seen, things that bump, and things that are bumped. [In each case] it’s not the case that people see things because they’re ‘seen’. It’s the other way around. Things are ‘seen’ because people see them. And people don’t bump things because they’re ‘bumped’; they’re ‘bumped’ because people bump them. And people don’t carry things because they’re ‘carried’; they’re ‘carried’ because people carry them.”2 (ibid) Indeed extending this logic to things that are loved; God (switching back to monotheism merely for ease of use) doesn’t love something because it is a loved thing. It is a loved thing because people love it. Quickly, ‘holy’ or ‘good’ can become detached from ‘god-loved’. If ‘god-loved’ (or ‘god- willed’) were to mean exactly the same thing as ‘good’ then it would follow that if God wills something because it is good, then He must also will it because it is god-willed. Yet, as we’ve established that second statement is incongruous with the other types of action we’ve discussed (carrying seeing, etc.). By contrast, if what’s god-willed is merely god-willed because God wills it, then what’s good should also be good merely because god wills it. This second statement, again, seems out of touch with our common intuitions. Hence we arrive at the titular problem, ‘Is something good because God wills it, or does He will it because it is good?’. There are defendants of both possibilities and this essay will demonstrate the problems of each.>GET ANSWER