Debate the advantages and disadvantages of quantitative and qualitative research based on your research experiences.
ce but simply harder to disobey. This benevolence, stemming from God’s omniscience, presents a pitfall for the first hornist. For, while God’s willing of acts making them moral maintains his omnipotence, it removes the sense of compassion, care and love that God has thus limiting him in another way. If whatever is willed is good, then God’s goodness is determined by his own submission to his will. However, this undermines the good of God himself, his nature. Having a will that arbitrarily legislates things as universally good seems more like the profile of a tyrant rather than a prudent, loving God, yet since whatever he wills is good, his goodness is also subject to his own arbitrary commands. Of course, the theist will respond that the commands of the all-loving and all-powerful are not arbitrary or in any way like a tyrant but the problem is how one explains this when there is no criteria by which to judge him, since all his commands are good. Liebniz argued that in saying things are not good by any rule of goodness, but simply by God’s will, “one destroys all the love of God and all his glory”. Indeed, praising God and his actions seems a hollow concept if he would be equally praiseworthy for doing the opposite. Thus “this opinion would hardly distinguish God from the devil”, as God’s goodness is dismissed, making it impossible to explain the difference between an omnibenevolent God and an omnipotent sadist. As Lewis puts it, “if good is to be defined as what God commands, then the goodness of God Himself is emptied of meaning and the commands of an omnipotent fiend would have the same claim on us as those of the ‘righteous Lord’”. The idea is that what makes God good is his omniscience and that what he wills is well-considered and prudent, but something cannot be prudent if there are no values on which to decide what to command, and therefore God’s commands are necessarily arbitrary. An attitude towards God which insists on his following because that is what we ‘ought’ to do, would seem in the way Kant insisted to be making morality prior to God. Yet, the proponent of this second horn, that God commands what is good, holds a position that seems similarly tenuous. The central problem with this approach is that by limiting what God can command to what is already good, one places a restriction on God’s power, which contradicts his omnipotence. A defence of such a proposition might broadly resemble this: moral truths are necessarily true, not being able to do the logically impossible is no restriction of power, no less than being able to make a bachelor a married man is. Under this objectivist framework, one argues that “moral judgements such as that an action x is a right action or that it is morally better than y, or that actions of type A are never morally good, are statements which are true or false”4 (4 The Coherence of Theism, R. Swinburne, Chapter 11, p. 207.). Indeed, that is not to say that there are no times when two choices are morally level, merely that sometimes this is not the case- some lifestyles are indeed morally better or worse than others. Thus statements affirming such an action have a truth value. By extension, “an omniscient person […] will know of any action, the characteristics of w>GET ANSWER