such a kind in such-and-such circumstances), whether or not that action is morally good or bad”5 (ibid., p. 208). Thus God will necessarily do those actions he sees as good and avoid those which are bad and in doing so will still be omnipotent. His unflinching commitment to moral law can best be seen when we imagine the opposite. A God who “does not care to support with his will the moral principles that we believe are true” thus either “opposes some of them, or does not care enough about some of them to act on them”6 (‘Moral Arguments for Theistic Belief’, R. Adams, Part 4.). Indeed, as Adams explains, “if we really believed there is a God like that, who understands so much and yet disregards some or all of our moral principles, it would be extremely difficult for us to continue to regard those principles with the respect that we believe is due them”7 (ibid). Given we believe that we ought to pay them respect, there is a great moral disadvantage to belief in an immoral or amoral God. There are, of course, problems with the second hornist’s perspective. First, in creating the world, is it not possible that God also created logic and, with it, logical and moral necessities? That is, while we may struggle to conceive of such a world, it seems perfectly possible to claim God existed before conceptual necessity and that it was brought about merely as another construction of his. A truly all-powerful God then could surely create a world without such necessity. If moral necessity does not exist outside of God then we may ask again whether God introduced such necessities because they were good or are they good because he willed them. The second issue is that the idea of moral necessity demands more development than Swinburne gives it. The idea that torture or inducing agonising pain in someone is necessarily morally bad seems only to be linguistic or intuitive rather than metaphysical. If the word agonising means causing an evil level of pain or the thought of torture is so untenable, then there is a sense in which these actions might seem like moral necessities phenomenologically. But where in any of this, is there any evidence of such actions actually being metaphysically necessarily moral or immoral. Any attempt to describe them as such, using the language of ‘so bad’, invariably rests on a hidden premise that is utilitarianism or some other deontological theory that needs to be elucidated to give the action its necessity, otherwise epistemologically we cannot know any moral necessities and as such there is no evidence for their metaphysical existence. It just seems to be asserted that moral necessities exist, but there must be something that has given, or is justification for their necessity. In absence of a reason, and without being able to use God since that takes us to the first horn, an explanation>