- The market demand curve for a pair of Cournot duopolists is given as P=36-3Q, where
Q=Q1+Q2. For each duopolists, the constant per unit marginal cost is $18/unit and fixed
costs are zero.
a. Find the Cournot equilibrium price, quantity and profits.
b. Solve the problem for Bertrand duopolists.
c. Find the equilibrium price, quantity and profit for each firm, assuming the firms act as a
Stackelberg leader and follower, with Firm 1 as the leader.
- The following payoff matrix represents the long-run payoffs for two duopolists faced with
the option of buying or leasing buildings to use for production. Determine whether any
dominant strategies exist and whether or not there is a Nash equilibrium.
Leasing Building Buying Building
Leasing Building F1=500
Buying Building F1=300
- Let there be two consumers A and B, and two goods X and Y. Assume UA (XA,YA) = X2 Y
and UB (XB,YB) = XY, given the initial allocation (XE =7, YE =2) for consumer A and (XE =2,
E =4) for consumer B. Solve for the optimal allocation of resources given an exchange
economy by two players (A, B) and two goods (X, Y).
fighting, putting the migrants directly at risk as was shown by the July 2019 Tajoura migrant centre airstrike. These detention centres are mainly populated by migrants intercepted at sea by the Libyan Coast Guard. The EU and particularly Italy’s continued support of Libya’s maritime activities which directly promotes detention practices needs to be reassessed. Lastly, smuggling and trafficking are central concerns of migration in Libya. While under the UNTOC protocols these are very distinct (i.e. the intent of the perpetrator and the migrant’s consent), in Libya their line has been increasingly blurred, as smuggling can be choreographed as a first phase towards eventual exploitation and trafficking. Under Gaddaffi, as part of a social contract, smuggling networks were overlooked in exchange of political loyalty and revenue share. Since 2014 these practices gained in importance as the internal environment allows for more overt smuggling and as militias battle over power and territorial control, and hence need financial resources. In the communities living near the Mediterranean and the southern border of Libya, smuggling has become the most, if not the sole profitable business. Smuggling of human beings, in fact, is an important source of revenue towards the illicit economy as, with the help of middlemen, smugglers ask migrants to pay for their travels, for additional fees through forced labour and some are kidnapped and left in detention centres with ransoms being the only way out. Migrants are also often used to trade goods. When it comes to trafficking, migrants caught by the Libyan coast guard are frequently put in jail and sold into slavery, sexually exploited or tortured for money. The EU and its member states have various policies and mechanisms put in place to manage migration in Libya. These include the Memorandum of Understanding on Migration between Italy and Libya. It was first signed on February 2nd 2017 and was renewed and extended for three years with no amendments in February 2020. The Malta declaration came the day after and endorses the same terms. The memorandum stipulates Italy’s material and technical support to the Libyan Coast Guard under the UN-recognised Government of National Accord (GNA). Italy supports training, and equipment of Libyan authorities, enhancing their abilities to intercept migrants at sea and return them to detention centres in Libya. As previously highlighted, in detention centres migrants face abuse and unlawful detention. Since the start of the memorandum 40 000 people have been reportedly intercepted at se>GET ANSWER